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Note 
 
Punishing the Pettifogger’s Practice: Applying 
the Sanction Power of 28 U.S.C. § 1927 to Law 
Firms 
Joseph T. Janochoski∗ 
As is likely the case in most fields, the legal profession will 
inevitably suffer from the occasional bad lawyer, a pettifogger.1 
The pettifoggery that such lawyers occasionally unleash upon 
the judiciary can vary from the rather insignificant,2 to situa-
tions arguably deserving of stern condemnation.3 Such behavior 
impacts the judicial system in at least two ways: improper attor-
ney conduct undermines the public’s faith in the justice system, 
 
∗  J.D. Candidate 2018, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like 
to thank Professor Bradley Clary and the invaluable staff of the University of 
Minnesota Law Library for helping me shape this Note into its final product. 
Thanks also to Hannah Nelson, Frank Guenthner, and Taylor Mayhall for their 
feedback, and to Jessi Sharpe, Charles Niemann, Sarah DeWitt, and David 
LaBerge for their invaluable editing skills. Finally, I would like to thank my 
family for their continuous, overwhelming support. Copyright © 2018 by Joseph 
T. Janochoski. 
 1. Black’s Law Dictionary defines a pettifogger as “a lawyer lacking in ed-
ucation, ability, sound judgment, or common sense,” or alternatively, “a lawyer 
who clouds an issue with insignificant details.” Pettifogger, BLACK’S LAW DIC-
TIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 2. See generally Adam Liptak, Judge Finds a Typo-Prone Lawyer Guilty 
of Bad Writing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 4, 2004), http://www.nytimes.com/2004/03/04/ 
us/judge-finds-a-typo-prone-lawyer-guilty-of-bad-writing.html (reducing a 
plaintiff ’s lawyer ’s award of fees due to unintelligible prose and arguments in 
his submissions to the court). 
 3. A recent example of insidious pettifoggery can be seen in the Prenda 
Law copyright trolling enterprise, where two attorneys filed lawsuits against 
thousands of defendants across the country accusing them of illegally download-
ing pornographic movies. After subpoenaing the identity of subscribers behind 
IP addresses suspected of the downloads, the attorneys sent threatening letters 
that usually induced the defendants to settle “either out of fear of humiliation 
or inability to pay for litigation. . . . Each defendant would typically pay around 
$4,000.” Both attorneys were later found to have “engaged in abusive litigation, 
fraud on courts across the country, and willful violation of court orders.” See Joe 
Mullin, Prenda Lawyers Lose Key Appeal, Will Pay $230k Sanction, ARSTECH-
NICA (June 10, 2016), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2016/06/appeals-court 
-upholds-sanctions-against-prenda-law-copyright-scheme. 
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and it undermines the role of an attorney as an officer of the 
court.4 
In order to minimize any damage to the justice system or the 
public, courts rely on a “panoply of procedural and substantive” 
tools and approaches that can be utilized to discourage and deter 
attorney misconduct.5 One such tool, found in a variety of au-
thorities,6 is the ability of courts to sanction individual attor-
neys. Sanctions against attorneys, as one court recognized, are 
crucial to preventing abuses in litigation and promoting the effi-
cient administration of the entire judicial system.7 Abuses of the 
litigation process can lead to delay, and delay causes hardship 
 
 4. See generally Butler v. Biocore Med. Techs, Inc., 348 F.3d 1163, 1173 
(10th Cir. 2003) (“[A]ttorney misconduct both implicates the attorney’s fitness 
to function as an officer of the court and triggers the court’s responsibility to 
protect the public from unscrupulous or unqualified practitioners.”); Cannon v. 
Loyola Univ. of Chi., 676 F. Supp. 823, 830 (N.D. Ill. 1987) (“Attorneys are of-
ficers of the court, and their first duty is to the administration of justice.”). Pun-
ishment of such misconduct is crucial in order to maintain positive public per-
ception of the profession. See Jennifer M. Kraus, Comment, Attorney Discipline 
Systems: Improving Public Perception and Increasing Efficacy, 84 MARQ. L. 
REV. 273, 289 (2000) (noting that “the attorney discipline system[s] must con-
tinually combat criticism with policies that inspire public confidence”); Staci Za-
retsky, Lawyers: The Most Despised Profession in America, ABOVE THE LAW 
(July 15, 2013), http://abovethelaw.com/2013/07/lawyers-the-most-despised 
-profession-in-america (describing the legal profession as one the public rou-
tinely classifies as the least contributive to society’s well-being). 
 5. Indeed, this panoply of tools includes Rules 11 and 37 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure, as well as various discovery rules. Furthermore, 
“[j]udges can supplement these rules with their own creative responses using 
the court’s inherent power.” Judith A. McMorrow et al., Judicial Attitudes To-
ward Confronting Attorney Misconduct: A View From the Reported Decisions, 
32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1425, 1427 (2004) (discussing the attitudes of the judiciary 
regarding confronting attorney misconduct and the tools available to judges in 
that capacity). 
 6. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 766 (1980) (recogniz-
ing, though not for the first time, the inherent power of courts to sanction attor-
neys who litigate in bad faith or abuse the litigation system). See also FED. R. 
CIV. P. 11 (authorizing a court to sanction an attorney who signs a “paper” lack-
ing any basis in existing law, fact, or a good faith argument for the modification, 
reversal, or extension of said law); FED. R. CIV. P. 16(f ) (authorizing courts to 
sanction a party or a party’s attorney who fails to attend pretrial conferences); 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(g) (authorizing sanctions against parties or a party’s attorney 
for particular discovery abuses); FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (authorizing sanctions for 
failing to comply with discovery orders); FED. R. APP. P. 38 (authorizing sanc-
tions against a party or a party’s attorney for frivolous appeals). 
 7. Oliveri v. Thompson, 803 F.2d 1265, 1267 (2d Cir. 1986) (noting that 
severe abuse of the litigation system may lead to appropriately severe sanc-
tions). 
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on both the courts and the litigants.8 Consequently, while sanc-
tions are ideally a rare remedy,9 they serve an important role in 
preventing delay from plaguing the judiciary. 
An important source of sanction power is 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
the federal statute that allows a court to require “any attorney 
or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of the 
United States” to “satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses, 
and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred” from conduct that “mul-
tiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexa-
tiously.”10 The statute, first enacted in 1813,11 was originally de-
signed to prevent attorneys from filing multiple lawsuits where 
one suit would suffice.12 Over time, the statute’s text and under-
lying purpose have been expanded to include—and perhaps even 
primarily target—a multitude of delay-inducing activities in 
which attorneys engage.13 Indeed, in § 1927’s most recent 
amendment, Congress explained that its purpose in amending 
the statute was to “expand[] the category of expenses the judge 
might require an attorney to satisfy personally” to address dila-
tory conduct.14 
Recent developments in how modern law firms function, 
however, pose problems for the effectiveness of § 1927’s sanction 
power to deter delaying tactics. As the legal profession has 
 
 8. See O’Donnell v. Watson Bros. Transp. Co., 183 F. Supp. 577, 581 (N.D. 
Ill. 1960) (“Delay causes hardship . . . brings our courts into disrepute . . . [and] 
results in deterioration of evidence through loss of witnesses, forgetful memo-
ries and death of parties and makes it less likely that justice will be done . . . .”). 
 9. Constant use of sanctioning power can cause a chilling effect on the 
“paramount principle of free access to the courts” by presenting such a potent 
threat to uncertain litigants that they may not bring the claim in the first place. 
See David Allen Shaneyfelt, Comment, Courts Are No Place for Fun and Frivol-
ity: A Warning to Vexatious Litigants and Over-Zealous Attorneys, 
20 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 441, 445 (1984). Access to the courts remains im-
portant, as even “[a] man with a poor case is as much entitled to have it judi-
cially determined by usual legal processes as the man with a good case.” Bar-
tholomew v. Bartholomew, 132 P.2d 297, 302 (1942). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 11. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 3, 3 Stat. 19, 21 (current version codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 12. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813) (noting the need for a “Legislative pro-
vision” to “prevent multiplicity of suits” where a single lawsuit or process “might 
suffice for the administration of justice”). 
 13. For example, in 1980 Congress amended § 1927 by adding to the phrase 
“excess costs” to “expenses, and attorneys’ fees reasonably incurred because of 
such . . . conduct.” The purpose of these additions was “to deter unnecessary 
delays in litigation.” See H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234, at 8 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). 
 14. Id. 
 1736 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [102:1733 
 
evolved, it has become increasingly specialized.15 This speciali-
zation has been driven by increased demand for legal services; 
law firms seeking to tap into this demand have chosen to market 
their legal expertise by highlighting their specializations.16 Spe-
cialization, particularly in commercial firms, has led to the de-
cline of individual attorney autonomy and the increased emula-
tion of a corporate structure,17 which in turn decreases 
individual attorney autonomy over particular client matters.18 It 
is here where the modern practice of law presents a problem for 
§ 1927’s effectiveness: on its face, the statute’s language seeks to 
sanction individual attorneys for their dilatory conduct, but the 
modern reduction in individual attorney autonomy over particu-
lar client matters indicates that even if an attorney is a signatory 
on a motion or request, it is more likely the law firm as a whole 
that has pursued the dilatory conduct.19 In such a situation, 
sanctioning the individual attorney does little to prevent delay-
inducing conduct. Furthermore, sanctioning the law firm as a 
whole appears, on its face, to be outside § 1927’s purview.20 
 
 15. Richard Moorhead, Lawyer Specialization—Managing the Professional 
Paradox, 32 LAW & POL’Y 226, 227 (2010) (noting that specialization within the 
legal profession is both “well established” and “growing in impact”). 
 16. Id. at 228 (noting that “elite law firms solidify their position [on the 
market] . . . by expanding and underlining their reputation for excellence 
through that process of specialization.”). 
 17. See id. at 229 (“In commercial firms, specialization is said to have ad-
vanced alongside a decline in lawyer autonomy while commercial lawyers be-
come wealthier . . . and increasingly emulate the business structures of their 
clients.”). 
 18. See id. (noting specializations parallel development alongside decline in 
attorney autonomy). See also Luis Garicano & Thomas N. Hubbard, Specializa-
tion, Firms, and Markets: The Division of Labor Within and Between Law Firms, 
25 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 339, 360 (2009) (noting that specialized firms tend to in-
crease the division of labor across individuals). 
 19. Indeed, in some cases, misconduct is the underlying result of structural 
or cultural pressures within a firm. LISA G. LERMAN & PHILIP G. SCHRAG, ETH-
ICAL PROBLEMS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAW 100–01 (Erwin Chemerinsky et al. 
eds., 4th ed. 2016). 
 20. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The law firm, on its face, is arguably not a person for 
the purposes of § 1927. However, modern day conceptions of corporations as 
“moral” persons suggest that as a matter of statutory interpretation, it is plau-
sible that a law firm emulating a corporate structure could be considered a per-
son under § 1927. See, e.g., Peter A. French, The Corporation as a Moral Person, 
16 AM. PHIL. Q. 207, 207 (1979) (laying the philosophical groundwork for a the-
ory that allows treatment of corporations as members of the moral community, 
“of equal standing with the traditionally acknowledged residents: biological hu-
man beings, . . . [and therefore making] responsibility ascriptions [to corpora-
tions] perfectly proper.”). 
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This problem has manifested in a federal circuit split per-
taining to the scope of § 1927.21 The Courts of Appeal for the 
Sixth, Seventh and Ninth Circuits have all held that § 1927 can-
not be used to sanction law firms,22 whereas the Courts of Appeal 
for the District of Columbia, Second, Third, Eighth, and Elev-
enth Circuits, and the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, 
have all held that § 1927 may be used to sanction law firms.23 
The Supreme Court has yet to take up the issue, which renders 
§ 1927’s application inconsistent nationwide. Such inconsistency 
in application is particularly disconcerting considering the rise 
of national and international law firms that operate on a nation-
wide basis.24 If, for example, a highly specialized international 
law firm with a broad division of labor and low individual attor-
ney autonomy is litigating in numerous courts around the coun-
try, the potential dilatory tactics on the part of the firm may go 
unaddressed. Furthermore, even if such tactics are addressed by 
 
 21. This problem has been explored in the past, albeit at a time when the 
circuit split was less pronounced. See generally Jessica A. Winn, Note, A Firm 
Law for Sanctions: Taking a Stance on Whether 28 U.S.C. § 1927 Should Apply 
to Law Firms, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2135 (2016). That note explored possible 
remedies for resolving the circuit split by proposing that circuit courts align 
their positions, encouraging the Supreme Court to review the issue, and propos-
ing statutory language changes to encompass law firms. Id. at 2176–84. This 
Note, on the other hand, expands the existing literature by analyzing more re-
cent decisions that have widened the circuit split. Furthermore, this Note ar-
gues that statutory interpretation principles, the purpose of § 1927, changes in 
how modern law firms operate, and ethical considerations all counsel applying 
the statute to law firms. See also Kevin C. Kifer, Law Firms Are People, Too? 
Law Firm Sanctions Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927 and the Strained Reading of “Per-
son”, 61 ST. LOUIS U.L.J. 547 (2017) (taking the position that the language of 
§ 1927 does not encompass law firms); Vincent J. Margiotta, Note, Affirming 
Firm Sanctions: The Authority To Sanction Law Firms Under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
86 FORDHAM L. REV. 265 (2017) (taking the position that a Congressional 
amendment, or the use of inherent authority, should be the primary method of 
resolving the circuit split). 
 22. See generally Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 799 F.3d 1290 (9th Cir. 
2015); FM Indus. Inc., v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335 (7th Cir. 2010); 
Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 23. See generally Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 
2011); Smith v. Grand Bank & Tr. of Fla., 193 F. App’x 833 (11th Cir. 2006); Lee 
v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., 236 F.3d 443 (8th Cir. 2001); LaPrade v. Kidder 
Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus 
Ltd., 764 F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1985); MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 
B.R. 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
 24. James F. Holderman, Section 1927 Sanctions and the Split Among the 
Circuits, LITIG., Fall 2005, at 44, 47 (noting “[t]he need for consistency in the 
application of Section 1927 is heightened by the proliferation of national and 
international law firms and the ever-increasing mobility of the trial lawyers 
who litigate in courts throughout the country”). 
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the circuits that permit sanctions against law firms under 
§ 1927, the inconsistent nature of the statute’s application pre-
sents only a patchwork solution to the problem. The lack of a 
uniform application of § 1927 may also have the effect of chilling 
zealous advocacy on a nationwide basis.25 
This Note argues that the historical development and pur-
pose of § 1927, coupled with modern statutory interpretation, 
policy, and ethical considerations, supports reading § 1927 as en-
abling sanctions to be levied against law firms. Part I presents 
an overview of the historical formation and purpose of § 1927, 
tracing the statute from its 1813 roots through its various itera-
tions, leading up to its modern-day language. Part II explores 
and analyzes the reasoning and positions of the above-men-
tioned circuit split over whether § 1927 may be used to sanction 
an attorney’s law firm. Part III argues that innovative statutory 
interpretation principles, forward-looking policy surrounding 
the treatment of corporations and businesses as persons, and 
strong ethical considerations pertaining to zealous advocacy 
calls for § 1927 to be interpreted as permitting sanctions against 
a law firm. In short, this Note argues that in light of the modern, 
specialized practice of law, and the way modern law firms func-
tion, law firms should necessarily be considered persons under 
the purview of § 1927. 
I.  THE LEGISLATIVE FORMATION AND DEVELOPMENT 
OF 28 U.S.C. § 1927   
To understand the modern version of § 1927, it is essential 
to trace its history back to its original enactment. Section A ex-
plores the statute’s original enactment, Section B traces the his-
torical development of the statute, and Section C evaluates 
§ 1927’s current language and status. By following the statute’s 
gradual growth and expansion over the last 200 years, this anal-
ysis suggests that the purpose of § 1927 is to provide a broad 
remedy to address dilatory conduct and increased costs in litiga-
tion. 
 
 25. Id. (“[T]he adoption of one standard for the application of Section 1927 
would otherwise assist in allowing busy trial attorneys, who also have a duty to 
zealously advocate for their clients, to know with greater certainty what is and 
is not acceptable behavior in the federal district courts of all 94 districts, regard-
less of location.”). 
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A. THE ENACTMENT OF THE ORIGINAL § 1927 
Over 200 years ago, Congress passed an act designed to pre-
vent parties from recovering the costs incurred in filing numer-
ous lawsuits “whenever there [are] several actions or processes 
against persons who might legally be joined in one action or pro-
cess, touching any demand or matter in dispute before a court of 
the United States.”26 The Act gave federal courts the broad 
power to consolidate actions for the purposes of avoiding unnec-
essary costs or delays,27 and specifically prohibited recovery of 
the incurred costs of more than one joinable action “unless spe-
cial cause” for filing several actions is “satisfactorily shown on 
motion in open court.”28 In an effort to deter this behavior in the 
first place, the Act also stated in Section 3 that “if any attorney 
. . . or other person admitted to manage and conduct causes in a 
court of the United States” appears to have “multiplied the pro-
ceedings in any cause before the court” in such a way as to “in-
crease costs unreasonably and vexatiously,” that person “may be 
required by order of court to satisfy any excess . . . costs so in-
curred.”29 
The 1813 law was the first formulation of what would later 
become § 1927, and was designed to prevent multiple lawsuits 
where a single suit would suffice.30 It would be another twenty-
nine years, however, before a more detailed explanation of the 
Act’s primary purpose would be provided. In 1842, in response 
to the request for a study on the judicial expenses of the United 
States, the Secretary of the Treasury published a letter to the 
House of Representatives which mentioned the 1813 law.31 In 
that letter, the Secretary detailed the practices of certain United 
States district attorneys who, to increase their compensation, 
 
 26. Act of July 22, 1813, ch. 14, § 1, 3 Stat. 19, 19–20. 
 27. Id. § 3 (noting the federal courts may “make such orders and rules con-
cerning proceedings therein as may be conformable to the principles and usages 
belonging to courts for avoiding unnecessary costs or delay . . . and accordingly 
causes may be consolidated”). 
 28. Id. § 1. 
 29. Id. § 3. 
 30. 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 (1813) (noting the need for a “[l]egislative pro-
vision” to “prevent multiplicity of suits” where a single lawsuit or process would 
suffice). 
 31. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842). 
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filed numerous and unnecessary lawsuits.32 The statute’s pur-
pose was to counteract such practices and rein in the judicial 
costs of the United States, though according to the Secretary the 
provision was, at the time, “insufficient to prevent the abuses or 
mischiefs which have occurred. ”33 Consequently, at its very be-
ginning, the congressional purpose underlying the language 
later incorporated into § 1927 was to prevent attorneys from un-
reasonably and vexatiously multiplying both the costs and sheer 
number of lawsuits in litigation. 
B. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF § 1927 
The 1813 law was not addressed again until 1853, when 
Congress returned to the problems facing the federal courts. In 
an act setting comprehensive fees and costs for all federal ac-
tions, Congress reenacted substantially the same language of the 
1813 act.34 In 1901, Congress moved the provision to Section 982 
of the Revised Statutes, but retained substantially the same lan-
guage enacted in the 1853 act.35 The language remained the 
same up until 1948, when Congress modified the text to make it 
clear that the increased costs from any unreasonable and vexa-
tious conduct that multiplied proceedings were to be assessed 
against the attorneys themselves, not clients.36 Specifically, Con-
gress modified the statute to read: “Any attorney . . . who so mul-
tiplies the proceedings in any case as to increase costs unreason-
ably and vexatiously may be required by the court to satisfy 
personally such excess costs.”37 This change was based on Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, which held that the purpose 
behind the “vexatious” statute was to punish attorneys who un-
reasonably and vexatiously multiplied legal costs, rather than 
the parties to the suit.38 
 
 32. Id. This letter was also noted by the Supreme Court in a 1980 decision 
interpreting the 1980 version of 28 U.S.C. § 1927. See Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 759 n.6 (1980). 
 33. H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 21. 
 34. Act of Feb. 26, 1853, ch. 80, § 1, 10 Stat. 161, 162. 
 35. COMPILED STATUTES OF THE UNITED STATES, 1901, tit. 8, ch. 18, § 982 
(Mallory 1902). 
 36. Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 123, 62 Stat. 869, 957 (1948) (codified as 
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1927). 
 37. Id. (emphasis added). Congress also moved the statute to its current 
position, title 28, in the United States Code.  
 38. See Motion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 201 F. 63 (2d Cir. 1912). The 
House Report explaining the amendment stated that, unlike the general phra-
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The language of the statute remained untouched until 1980 
when, in response to a narrow interpretation handed down in a 
Supreme Court case, Congress expanded the costs that could be 
assessed against attorneys who violated the statute’s provisions. 
In 1980, the Supreme Court decided Roadway Express, Inc. v. 
Piper, which interpreted the word “costs” in § 1927 as not includ-
ing attorney’s fees.39 In response to Roadway Express, Congress 
amended § 1927 by modifying the kinds of costs able to be as-
sessed to include “excess costs, expenses, and attorneys’ fees rea-
sonably incurred because of such [unreasonable and vexatious] 
conduct.”40 The legislative history behind the change explained 
that the purpose of the modifications was to “broaden the range 
of increased expenses which an attorney who engages in dilatory 
litigation practices may be required by the judge to satisfy per-
sonally.”41 In light of the Piper decision, Congress wanted to en-
sure that if an attorney did violate the existing standard cover-
ing the dilatory conduct, and “by such conduct cause[d] the other 
parties to incur expenses and fees” that would not have occurred 
without said violation, the attorney should be “required to sat-
isfy personally [the] full range of excess costs attributable to such 
conduct.”42 In short, Congress expanded the kinds of costs that 
could be assessed personally against the attorney responsible for 
the offending conduct in an effort to give § 1927 broad reach. 
C. THE CURRENT STATUS OF § 1927 
Congress has not modified or moved § 1927 since the 1980 
amendments discussed above. The statute reads: 
Any attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases in any court of 
the United States or any Territory thereof who so multiplies the pro-
ceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may be required by 
 
seology changes, the word personally was “inserted upon the authority of Mo-
tion Picture Patents Co. v. Steiner, 1912, 201 F. 63.” H.R. REP. 88-308, at A164 
(1947). 
 39. Roadway Express, Inc. v. Piper, 447 U.S. 752, 761–62 (1980). 
 40. Antitrust Procedural Improvements Act of 1980 § 3, § 1927, 94 Stat. 
1154, 1156. 
 41. H.R. REP. NO. 96-1234, at 8 (1980) (Conf. Rep.). The Conference Report 
noted that § 1927 referred, prior to the amendments, to “excess costs,” which 
was a phrase “construed to cover only the narrow category of taxable costs, such 
as filing fees.” Id. The fact that Congress acted on this statute the same year 
that the Supreme Court handed down Piper suggests that the narrow construc-
tion referred to in the legislative history was the Supreme Court’s narrow con-
struction in Piper. 
 42. Id. (emphasis added). 
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the court to satisfy personally the excess costs, expenses and attorneys’ 
fees reasonably incurred because of such conduct.43 
Congressional modifications to the statute over time have 
expanded the kinds of costs that courts can assess against indi-
vidual attorneys. Perhaps as a result of the lack of congressional 
attention the statute has received, § 1927 has found a place at 
the center of a wide circuit split pertaining to its application to 
law firms. 
II.  THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER PUNISHING LAW FIRMS 
UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927   
Almost all the federal circuit courts have weighed in on 
whether § 1927 applies to law firms. While the reasoning in each 
court varies slightly, the disagreement appears to center around 
ascribing literal authority to the exact text of the statute, as op-
posed to contextualizing the reasoning and purpose of the stat-
ute into the modern practice of law. The Sixth, Seventh, and 
Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeals all hold that § 1927 does not 
permit the imposition of sanctions against a law firm,44 whereas 
the D.C., Second, Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Courts of Appeals, 
along with the First Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, have 
all held that the statute may apply to law firms.45 Section A of 
this Part explores the reasoning employed by the Circuits who 
have rejected the use of § 1927 to punish law firms, while Section 
B analyzes the reasoning used by the Circuits who have sup-
ported the use of § 1927 to punish law firms. Ultimately, the dif-
fering treatment the statute has received illustrates the need for 
a circuit reconciliation. 
 
 43. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 44. See, e.g., Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, 799 F.3d 1290, 1290 (9th Cir. 
2015); FM Indus. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335, 341–42 (7th Cir. 2010) 
(stating that liability under § 1927 is direct, not vicarious); BDT Prods., Inc. v. 
Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 742 (6th Cir. 2010); Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel 
Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389, 396–97 (6th Cir. 2009); Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 
F.3d 715, 715 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 45. See, e.g., Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 138 (2d Cir. 
2011); Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Fla., 193 F. App’x. 833, 838 (11th Cir. 
2006); Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 443 (8th Cir. 2001); 
LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 907 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Baker 
Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 212 (3d Cir. 1985); MJS Las Croabas 
Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 401 (B.A.P. 1st Cir. 2016). 
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A. CIRCUITS REJECTING THE USE OF § 1927 TO PUNISH LAW 
FIRMS 
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuit Courts of Appeal 
have all held that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanc-
tions against a law firm. Each circuit’s ruling is explored below 
in chronological order. 
1. The Seventh Circuit Has Held that § 1927 Does Not 
Encompass Law Firms 
The Seventh Circuit’s holding that § 1927 should not be ap-
plied to law firms has been foundational for other circuits.46 In 
Claiborne v. Wisdom, the Seventh Circuit dealt with several 
claims filed by an individual alleging she and other similarly sit-
uated women had been sexually harassed while they were ten-
ants of the defendant’s property, in violation of federal housing 
law.47 Her complaint represented that the plaintiff and her law-
yer interviewed corroborating witnesses before filing suit.48 
However, shortly after removal to federal court, plaintiff moved 
to voluntarily dismiss the action because “[t]o the complete sur-
prise and shock of Plaintiff and her counsel, the witnesses denied 
making the above-referenced statements and they accused 
Plaintiff and her counsel of fabricating the claims.”49 The district 
court dismissed the case with prejudice and granted sanctions 
under § 1927 in the amount of $107,846.77 against the plaintiff, 
her lawyer, and the lawyer’s firm, all of whom appealed.50 
The Seventh Circuit affirmed the sanctions against the 
plaintiff and her lawyer, but reversed the sanctions against the 
attorney’s law firm.51 The court noted that § 1927 refers specifi-
cally to “[a]ny attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases 
 
 46. See, e.g., BDT Prods., Inc., 602 F.3d at 751; Rentz, 556 F.3d at 396 n.6. 
 47. See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 717–18.  
 48. Id. at 718. 
 49. Id. The district court was unsatisfied with this explanation. As the Sev-
enth Circuit explained, citing the lower court’s opinion, “[the attorney] did not 
exhibit the diligence, professionalism, or competency that one would expect 
from an officer of the court . . . [h]ad [she] done her job in an objectively reason-
able manner, she would have realized that her client did not have a case . . . .” 
Id. at 721–22. 
 50. The district court assessed only one dollar in liability against the plain-
tiff herself. The remaining amount, $107,845.77, was assessed against her at-
torney and her law firm after a finding that her law firm was “jointly and sev-
erally liable.” Id. at 718. 
 51. Id. at 717. 
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in any court of the United States,” not law firms.52 Furthermore, 
the court noted that it was “too much of a stretch to say that a 
law firm could also be characterized as [another] person” for the 
purposes of § 1927,53 since only individual lawyers, not firms, are 
admitted to practice.54 In the court’s opinion, the “other persons” 
language in § 1927 refers only to those limited circumstances 
where “non-attorneys may appear in judicial proceedings, such 
as in patent proceedings or where law students receive special 
permission to conduct cases before they are admitted to the 
bar.”55 The Seventh Circuit also noted that its reasoning was 
consistent with the rationale used by the Supreme Court in 
Pavelic & LeFlore v. Marvel Entertainment Group, which dealt 
with whether an earlier version of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules 
of Civil Procedure could be used to sanction a law firm.56 In 
Pavelic, the Supreme Court construed Rule 11 language that 
permitted sanctions only against “the person who signed” the of-
fending document.57 Reversing the lower courts, the Supreme 
Court held that “[the] context [of] the phrase ‘the person who 
signed’ could only mean the individual signer, not his partner-
ship, either in addition to him or in the alternative.”58 The Sev-
enth Circuit found that the reasoning in Pavelic mirrored its own 
reasoning pertaining to § 1927 and threw out the sanctions 
against the law firm.59 
In FM Industries, Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., the 
Seventh Circuit reaffirmed Claiborne and its holding that § 1927 
 
 52. Id. at 723. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. (citing, among other rules, FED. R. APP. P. 46(a) as an example of a 
rule governing the admission of attorneys to conduct cases). 
 55. Id. (citing, among others, 37 C.F.R. § 10.14, which permits nonattorneys 
to practice before the U.S. Patent and Trademark office). 
 56. Pavelic & Leflore v. Marvel Entm’t Grp., 493 U.S. 120, 120 (1989) (“Rule 
11 sanctions may be imposed only upon [the] individual attorney who signs pa-
pers and not on attorneys’ law firm.”). As the Seventh Circuit noted, Rule 11 
was later amended to explicitly include law firms under its sanction authority. 
See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723. 
 57. Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 122–23 (“Just as the requirement of [a] signature 
is imposed upon the individual, we think the recited import and consequences 
of signature run as to him.”).  
 58. See Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 723 (citing Pavelic, 493 U.S. at 122–23). 
 59. Id. at 723–24. The court noted that, despite its ruling, the record 
demonstrated a “close connection between [the attorney’s] actions and those of 
her firm . . . it seems that the firm was on notice of the fact that the attorney’s 
litigation practice was questionable.” Id. at 724. Still, the court also noted that 
other avenues for sanctions, specifically Rule 11 and a court’s inherent power, 
were available. Id. 
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only applies to individual attorneys. In that case, the Seventh 
Circuit faced an appeal from sanctions levied against both the 
lead attorney, and a consulting attorney who had worked on the 
case.60 The court acknowledged appropriateness of sanctions 
against the plaintiff ’s attorney,61 but reversed the sanctions 
against the consulting attorney.62 Specifically, the court noted 
that sanctions under § 1927 are “direct, not vicarious.”63 Sec-
tion 1927 “does not require every lawyer who files an appearance 
to review and vet” documents filed by other lawyers in the case, 
as “[n]either the text of § 1927, nor any decision of which [the 
Seventh Circuit is] aware, imposes on any lawyer a duty to su-
pervise . . . another lawyer’s work.”64 As much as the lower court 
may have wanted to impose sanctions across the board, the Sev-
enth Circuit cautioned that “personal responsibility remains es-
sential to an award of sanctions under § 1927.”65 
2. The Sixth Circuit Has Aligned Itself with the Seventh 
Circuit and Held that § 1927 Does Not Encompass Law Firms 
In two key cases, the Sixth Circuit aligned itself with the 
Seventh Circuit and held that § 1927 may not be used to sanction 
law firms.66 In the first of these cases, Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel 
Industries, Inc., an individual who felt he had been cheated out 
of a one percent commission on a lucrative sports-apparel licens-
ing deal sued those who allegedly owed him that commission, 
and filed what were ultimately determined to be frivolous 
claims.67 The district court granted sanctions against the two at-
torneys under both Rule 11 and § 1927, but not the plaintiff or 
the lawyers’ firms.68 On appeal, the defendants alleged that the 
district court had abused its discretion by, among other things, 
 
 60. FM Indus., Inc. v. Citicorp Credit Servs., 614 F.3d 335, 337–38 (7th Cir. 
2010). 
 61. Id. at 340 (noting that the litigation had been “marked by excessive and 
unnecessary filing that richly deserve the label vexatious” and that “[the plain-
tiff ’s attorneys] objections are quibbles”). 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. (citing Claiborne, 414 F.3d at 722–24). 
 64. Id. at 341 (noting that “[the consulting attorney] was not hired to [vet 
the plaintiff ’s submissions], and no lawyer undertakes such a role for free”). 
 65. Id. 
 66. See BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742 (6th Cir. 2010); 
Rentz v. Dynasty Apparel Indus., Inc., 556 F.3d 389 (6th Cir. 2009). 
 67. See Rentz, 556 F.3d at 391–93 (“[R]uling that Rentz’s testimony demon-
strated subsequent attorney misconduct warranting sanctions .”).  
 68. Id. at 394. 
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failing to sanction one of the law firms involved under either 
Rule 11 or § 1927.69 
The Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s refusal to 
sanction any law firm involved in the case, noting explicitly, that 
“[the statute] authorizes the imposition of sanctions only against 
an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases.’”70 The 
court cited the Seventh Circuit’s Claiborne case for its position, 
and aside from clarifying the standard under which an individ-
ual attorney could be sanctioned using § 1927, offered no further 
refinement on the rule.71 
In the second case, BDT Products, Inc. v. Lexmark Interna-
tional, Inc., the plaintiff sued Lexmark for, among other things, 
the misappropriation of trade secrets related to a printer tray 
used in Lexmark printers.72 Ultimately, the district court deter-
mined that the lawsuit “should never have been brought, and in 
which no attorney should have persisted,”73 and imposed sanc-
tions on BDT, its attorneys, and the attorneys’ law firm under 
state statutes, § 1927, and its inherent power.74 BDT, its attor-
neys, and the attorneys’ law firm appealed on the grounds that 
§ 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanctions on a law 
firm.75 
The Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s imposition of 
sanctions under § 1927 against the law firm of the plaintiff ’s at-
torney, holding that while the prior Rentz decision offered no ad-
ditional analysis itself, that panel had cited Claiborne and the 
Seventh Circuit’s “well-reasoned explanation of why, under 
§ 1927, judges may not appropriately sanction law firms.”76 The 
BDT Products panel further quoted the Claiborne decision ex-
tensively, noting that they found the “analysis and reasoning of 
the Claiborne court persuasive” and confirmed what the Rentz 
court stated in dicta: “28 U.S.C. § 1927 does not authorize the 
 
 69. Id. at 391. 
 70. Id. at 395–96. 
 71. Id. at 396, n.6. 
 72. BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 743 (6th Cir. 
2010). 
 73. Id. at 749 (citation omitted). 
 74. Id. A court’s inherent power to sanction always exists; indeed, “[t]he 
sanctioning procedures contained in statutes and court rules merely reflect the 
inherent authority of a court to control its proceedings.” J.D. Page & Doug Sigel, 
The Inherent and Express Powers of Courts To Sanction, 31 S. TEX. L. REV. 43, 
46 (1990). 
 75. BDT Prods., 602 F.3d at 750. 
 76. Id. at 750–51 (citing Claiborne v. Wisdom, 414 F.3d 715, 722 (7th Cir. 
2005)). 
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imposition of sanctions on [a] law firm[].”77 In particular, the 
Court noted that “[e]ven if [a] firm[ ] can admittedly be personi-
fied in a literary sense through briefs, there is no reason to con-
sider a law firm a ‘person’ under [§ 1927] . . . .”78 Consequently, 
the court vacated the award of attorney’s fees against the law 
firm.79 
3. The Ninth Circuit Has Also Held that § 1927 Does Not 
Encompass Law Firms 
The last circuit to take the position that § 1927 cannot be 
applied against law firms is the Ninth Circuit. In Kaass Law v. 
Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., the plaintiff and her attorney filed a 
lawsuit against ten different defendants, including Wells Fargo 
Bank, alleging that the defendants had reported adverse infor-
mation about the plaintiff to credit agencies which reflected neg-
atively on the plaintiff ’s credit report.80 Following dismissal due 
to pleading defects, Wells Fargo filed a motion to recover attor-
neys’ fees and costs from the plaintiff and her attorney’s law firm 
under § 1927.81 The district court granted the motion with re-
gard to the law firm of the plaintiff ’s attorney, finding the firm 
had “acted in bad faith by knowingly raising frivolous arguments 
against Wells Fargo and other defendants. ”82 
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of 
sanctions against the law firm.83 The Ninth Circuit explained 
 
 77. Id. at 751 (noting that “there is no reason to consider a law firm a ‘per-
son’ under the statute” and “law firms are not ‘admitted’ to ‘conduct cases’ in 
court”). 
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. at 757. The Sixth Circuit also conducted an extensive analysis of 
whether sanctions would have been permissible under the district court’s inher-
ent power, but ultimately concluded that the district court had misinterpreted 
Sixth Circuit precedent. Id. 
 80. Kaass Law v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 799 F.3d 1290, 1291 (9th Cir. 
2015). 
 81. Id. at 1292 (filing a motion to recover $11,236.50 in attorneys’ fees and 
costs). 
 82. Id. at 1292–93 (noting that the law firm of the plaintiff ’s attor-
ney“fail[ed] to plead specific allegations or differentiate between defendants in 
the Complaint . . . fail[ed] to oppose defendants’ motions to dismiss . . . [and] 
fail[ed] to meet and confer or communicate with opposing counsel.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 83. Id. at 1292–93. The court noted that the plaintiff ’s attorney’s law firm 
advanced two grounds for appeal: the first was that § 1927 did not apply to law 
firms, whereas the second argued that § 1927 only prohibited conduct that “mul-
tiplies the proceedings, not for the filing of initial pleadings.” Id. at 1292. Be-
cause the Ninth Circuit agreed with the first argument, they did not reach the 
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that it had never addressed “whether a law firm may be consid-
ered an ‘attorney or other person admitted to conduct cases’” 
prior to this case, but ultimately concluded after “consideration 
of the persuasive reasoning of some of [the Ninth Circuit’s] sister 
circuits . . . that 28 U.S.C. § 1927 does not permit the award of 
sanctions against a law firm.”84 The court noted that § 1927 au-
thorizes recovery “only from an attorney or otherwise admitted 
representative of a party.”85 It then went on to extensively quote 
both the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Claiborne and the Sixth 
Circuit’s adoption of that decision in BDT Products.86 The Court 
observed that Rule 11 now “explicitly allows sanctions ‘on any 
attorney, law firm, or party that violated the rule or is responsi-
ble for the violation,’” whereas § 1927 does not.”87 In addition, 
the Court stated that the principle of statutory construction ex-
pressio unius88 suggests that the “specificity and precision of 
§ 1927 allow[s] for sanctions only against ‘attorneys’ or ‘other 
persons admitted to conduct cases.’”89 This specificity, the court 
noted, indicates an intention to exclude law firms from the sanc-
tion power of § 1927.90 The Ninth Circuit concluded that the 
Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ reasoning, coupled with the expres-
sio unius principle, was superior to any other sister circuits’ rea-
soning and held that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of 
sanctions against law firms.91 
 
second. Id. at 1293. 
 84. Id.  
 85. Id. at 1293 (citing Fed. Trade Comm’n v. Alaska Land Leasing, Inc., 
799 F.2d 507, 508–10 (9th Cir. 1986) (overturning sanctions against a financial 
consultant employed by attorneys representing two of the parties to the suit)). 
 86. Id. at 1293–94 (emphasizing that in both cases, the court held that a 
law firm cannot be considered a person under § 1927 (citing Claiborne v. Wis-
dom, 414 F.3d 715, 722–23 (7th Cir. 2005); BDT Prods., Inc. v. Lexmark Int’l, 
Inc., 602 F.3d 742, 750–51 (6th Cir. 2010)).  
 87. Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 11). 
 88. The full phrase, Expressio Unius Est Exclusio Alterius, means “the ex-
pression of one excludes others.” The rule serves to apply negative implication 
to statutory language, so that “[t]he presence of [a] specific term or specific list 
[in a statute] leads to the implication that the legislature intended to include 
only what was explicitly stated and no others.” RONALD BENTON BROWN & SHA-
RON JACOBS BROWN, STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: THE SEARCH FOR LEGISLA-
TIVE INTENT 102–03 (2d ed. 2011) (citing Gotkin v. Miller, 379 F. Supp. 859 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974)). 
 89. See Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)). 
 90. Id. (citing Longview Fibre Co. v. Rasmussen, 980 F.2d 1307, 1312–13 
(9th Cir. 1992)). 
 91. Id. at 1294 (noting reasoning from both the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, 
and specifically stating that it found “[the Seventh Circuit’s] reasoning persua-
sive”). 
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With regards to other circuit interpretations, the Court took 
issue with the Second, Third, and Eleventh Circuit’s positions on 
§ 1927. The Court criticized the Second Circuit, noting that “[one 
panel had] permitted a district court to impose sanctions against 
a law firm, but seemed to buttress its reasoning on the inherent 
powers of the district court, not on the express language of 
28 U.S.C. § 1927.”92 Such a “conclusory statement[ ],” in the 
Ninth Circuit’s opinion, “that ‘nothing in the language’ of [§ 
1927] forecloses the imposition of sanctions against a law firm” 
was unpersuasive because the Second Circuit ignored plaintiff ’s 
citations to Pavelic, Claiborne, and BDT Products, all of which 
point to specific language in the statute.93 
Similarly, the Ninth Circuit found both the Third Circuit 
and Eleventh Circuit’s reasoning lacking. It noted that “the 
Third Circuit sanctioned a law firm [under § 1927] before Rule 
11 was amended to explicitly include law firms, and did not ad-
dress the limiting statutory language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927.”94 The 
Eleventh Circuit’s position was criticized by the Ninth Circuit 
for a similar reason; specifically, the court concluded that the 
Eleventh Circuit had “conflated the sanctioning powers in two 
different rules when it upheld sanctions against lead counsel and 
his law firm pursuant ‘to the bad-faith exception, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1927, and Rule 11.’”95 Ultimately, the Ninth Circuit found no 
reason to detour from the Sixth and Seventh Circuit’s conclu-
sions and concluded that § 1927 cannot be used to sanction law 
firms.96 
The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all concluded 
that § 1927 does not permit the imposition of sanctions on law 
firm.97 Each circuit, leaning on each other’s reasoning for sup-
port, has taken the position that the express language of the 
statute, coupled with the availability of other sources of sanction 
 
 92. The Ninth Circuit quoted extensively from Enmon, noting that the 
case’s reasoning, and the source of its authority, was somewhat unclear. Id. at 
1294–95 (citing Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 147–48 (2d Cir. 
2012)). 
 93. Id. at 1295 (citing Brief for Appellant at 49, Enmon v. Prospect Capital 
Corp., 675 F.3d 138 (2d Cir. 2012) (No. 10-2811-cv) 2010 WL 4715535). 
 94. Id. at 1294 (citing Baker Indus. Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 209 
(3d Cir. 1985)). 
 95. Id. at 1294. 
 96. Id. at 1295 (“If Congress had intended to permit federal courts to impose 
sanctions against law firms pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1927, it would have in-
cluded an express authorization to do so in the statute.”). 
 97. See cases cited supra note 44. 
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powers, makes it improper to impose sanctions under § 1927.98 
The reasoning employed by these circuits necessarily rests upon 
a deliberative view of statutory interpretation, which assumes 
that the legislature acts as a deliberate body that considers prob-
lems and possible solutions critically.99 In this situation, it as-
sumes that the legislature deliberately excluded law firms from 
§ 1927’s reach.100 In addition, that same underlying reasoning 
necessarily “rejects the possibility that the legislature might not 
have meant exactly what it said.”101 In contrast, the circuits that 
support using § 1927 to impose sanctions on law firms read the 
statute broadly, utilizing a different interpretation.102 
B. CIRCUITS SUPPORTING THE USE OF § 1927 TO PUNISH LAW 
FIRMS 
Other circuits differ on their view of statutory interpretation 
and have thus reached a different conclusion with regards to 
§ 1927’s application to law firms. Specifically, the D.C., Second, 
Third, Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits, along with the First Cir-
cuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, each permit the imposition of 
§ 1927 sanctions against attorneys and law firms.103 Their rea-
soning is explored chronologically. 
1. The Third Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses Law 
Firms 
The Third Circuit was one of the earlier circuits to take a 
position on the issue, though it did so without providing any ac-
tual reasoning for applying § 1927 to law firms. In Baker Indus-
tries, Inc. v. Cerberus Limited, the plaintiff, Baker Industries, 
sought to enjoin defendant Cerberus from terminating a long-
term patent license for the manufacture of smoke detectors.104 
After extended litigation, the district court granted a motion for 
sanctions under § 1927 against the defendant’s law firm; the 
court found that filing hundreds of pages of objections to a ref-
eree decision that both parties had agreed to consider binding 
 
 98. See, e.g., Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1294–95 (citing the Sixth and Seventh 
Circuits as persuasive). 
 99. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35 (describing the deliberative view 
of statutory interpretation). 
 100. See Kaass Law, 799 F.3d at 1295.  
 101. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35. 
 102. See infra Part II.B. 
 103. See cases cited supra note 45 
 104. Baker Indus., Inc. v. Cerberus Ltd., 764 F.2d 204, 206 (3d Cir. 1985). 
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constituted sufficiently “vexatious to justify the award of attor-
neys’ fees directly against it under 28 U.S.C. § 1927.”105 The de-
fendant’s law firm appealed.106 
The Third Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions, but 
made no mention of why it found it appropriate to apply § 1927 
to law firms; the court’s discussion focused entirely on the stand-
ard used to apply § 1927.107 Despite explicitly requiring bad faith 
on the part of an offending attorney, the Baker court routinely 
referenced the defendant’s law firm throughout the opinion as 
the target of the sanctions.108 Consequently, it appears that the 
Third Circuit implicitly stated that the bad faith of a firm’s at-
torneys is attributable to the law firm as a whole. 
2. The Eleventh Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses 
Law Firms 
The Eleventh Circuit is in accord with the Third Circuit with 
respect to § 1927. In Avirgan v. Hull, two journalists and their 
lawyers filed a lawsuit against numerous “Central Intelligence 
Agency operatives, military intelligence personnel, arm[s] mer-
chants, mercenaries, and Colombian drug lords” alleging RICO 
violations pertaining to the Nicaraguan Contra affair.109 After 
two years of discovery, it became clear that the plaintiffs lacked 
any real evidence, and that they were aware of their lack of evi-
dence prior to initiating suit.110 The district court granted sum-
mary judgment for the defendants, and awarded attorneys’ fees 
and sanctions under both § 1927 and Rule 11 of the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure against the plaintiffs, lead counsel for 
 
 105. Id. at 207–08. 
 106. Id. at 208. 
 107. Id. at 208–09 (“We . . . read section 1927 to require a showing of actual 
bad faith before attorneys’ fees may be imposed.”). Interestingly, despite explic-
itly requiring bad faith on the part of an offending attorney, the Third Circuit 
routinely referenced the defendant’s law firm (Cravath) throughout the opinion 
as the target of the sanctions. 
 108. Id. at 208–09, 211 (focusing on the bad faith of an attorney’s conduct 
but concluding that “Cravath’s post-decision conduct was a flagrant breach of 
its stipulation . . . [that] transcend[ed] the bounds of zealous advocacy on behalf 
of a client.”). 
 109. Avirgan v. Hull, 932 F.2d 1572, 1575 (11th Cir. 1991). The court also 
noted that “[m]ost of the allegations [were] based geographically in Nicaragua, 
but some allegations accuse various appellees of anti-Communist operations in 
Cuba, Southeast Asia, Iran, and Libya.” Id. 
 110. Id. at 1581 (“The attorneys for the plaintiffs, the Christic Institute, 
must have known prior to suing that they had no competent evidence to sub-
stantiate the theories alleged in their complaint.”). The Christic Institute is a 
tax-exempt law firm which funded the litigation. Id. at 1576 n.3. 
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the plaintiffs, and the Christic Institute as the official law firm 
behind the litigation.111 
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the award of attor-
neys’ fees against both lead counsel, the individual plaintiffs, 
and the law firm supporting the litigation.112 With regards to the 
Christic Institute’s status as a law firm, the court noted that 
“[s]tatus as a public interest law firm or the nature of a claim 
does not confer immunity from attorneys’ fees for bringing and 
maintaining frivolous lawsuits.”113 Consequently, the Eleventh 
Circuit implied that for the purposes of § 1927, sanctioning a law 
firm is no different than sanctioning an attorney, at least in the 
eyes of that particular panel. 
This decision was later reaffirmed by the Eleventh Circuit 
in Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Florida.114 There, the Elev-
enth Circuit explicitly held that § 1927 permits sanctions against 
a law firm.115 The court cited the Avirgan decision, noted above, 
stating that as a result, “this court has implicitly determined 
that § 1927 applies to law firms . . . [the court is] not bound by 
other circuits that have reached the opposite conclusion.”116 De-
spite finding that sanctions could be imposed against law firms 
under § 1927, the Court affirmed the district court’s decision to 
not impose sanctions because “the [firm’s] conduct falls short of 
the bad faith requirement necessary for sanctions under 
§ 1927.”117 
3. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals Has Held That § 1927 
Encompasses Law Firms 
The D.C. Circuit has also implicitly applied § 1927 against 
law firms. In LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., the plaintiff, a 
former employee of Kidder Peabody, sued the company alleging 
 
 111. Id. at 1582. 
 112. Id. at 1583. 
 113. Id. at 1582–83. 
 114. Smith v. Grand Bank & Trust of Fla., 193 F. App’x 833, 838 (11th Cir. 
2006) (citing Avirgan, 932 F.2d at 1582). 
 115. Id. at 838 (“Grand Bank correctly argues that § 1927 allows for sanc-
tions against a law firm.”). 
 116. While the Eleventh Circuit was certainly resolute in its holding, it did 
not attempt to explore other circuits’ reasoning. Id. 
 117. Id. at 839. 
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common law and statutory violations stemming from her em-
ployment and termination.118 After a series of vexatious proce-
dural maneuvers, the district court granted sanctions against 
the law firm of the plaintiff ’s attorney.119 The firm appealed the 
order. 
On appeal, the D.C. Circuit affirmed the sanctions, though 
none of the arguments advanced by the law firm on appeal dealt 
with precluding sanctions under § 1927 against them due to 
their status as a law firm.120 Consequently, while the case stands 
for the proposition that sanctions may be applied against a law 
firm under § 1927, the D.C. Circuit’s opinion lacks any clear ex-
planation of why that is the case. 
4. The Eighth Circuit Has Held That § 1927 Encompasses 
Law Firms 
The Eighth Circuit has faced a similar situation; it has ap-
plied § 1927 sanctions against a law firm but has not expressly 
dealt with the question of whether the statute should be used in 
such a way. In Lee v. First Lenders Insurance Services, Inc., nine 
automobile purchasers filed a putative class action against nu-
merous defendants, alleging violations of the Minnesota Retail 
Installment Sales Act, Minnesota usury laws, the federal Truth 
in Lending Act, and RICO.121 One of the attorneys involved, 
Thomas J. Lyons, made the decision fairly far into the litigation 
to withdraw plaintiffs’ motion to certify the class, citing the need 
for “more time to file a third amended complaint, complete addi-
tional discovery, and reformulate the class certification motion 
with the help of new national class counsel.”122 However, Lyons 
never filed a third amended complaint, “effectively abandoning 
plaintiffs’ class action allegations.”123 The district court granted 
 
 118. LaPrade v. Kidder Peabody & Co., 146 F.3d 899, 900–01 (D.C. Cir. 
1998). 
 119. Id. at 901 (“The law firm of Liddle & Robinson . . . shall compensate 
Kidder, Peabody, & Co., for the vexatious and dilatory tactics of plaintiff ’s coun-
sel in filing ex parte papers in the State Court proceeding.”). 
 120. The law firm Liddle & Robinson advanced three arguments for vacating 
the district court’s decision: (1) the district court abused its discretion; (2) the 
district court did not support its order with sufficient findings of fact; and (3) 
the district court abused its discretion in awarding an “outrageously unreason-
able” figure. All were rejected. Id. at 903–06. 
 121. Lee v. First Lenders Ins. Servs., Inc., 236 F.3d 443, 444 (8th Cir. 2001). 
 122. Id. at 444. 
 123. Id. No reason was given explaining why the suit was abandoned. See 
id. 
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summary judgment in the defendant’s favor, and when the de-
fendants requested an award of $83,284.64 under § 1927, 
granted $15,000 in sanctions.124 
The Eighth Circuit affirmed the imposition of sanctions 
against Lyons’ law firm, noting that Lyons had filed “baseless 
class action claims” and numerous motions on those claims be-
fore “abandon[ing] the class allegations without explanation.”125 
Such conduct forced the defendants to “incur additional costs to 
defend the case as a class action.”126 Still, the question of 
whether § 1927 applies to law firms was not raised on appeal. 
Consequently, while the Lee decision stands for the proposition 
that § 1927 may be applied against law firms, there is no expla-
nation as to precisely why the statute may be used in such a way. 
5. The Second Circuit Has Held, with Explicit Reasoning, 
That § 1927 Encompasses Law Firms 
The Second Circuit has weighed in on the issue, and unlike 
several of the circuit courts discussed above, it has provided far 
more of an explanation for its position. In Enmon v. Prospect 
Capital Corp., Arnold & Itkin, a Texas-based law firm, appealed 
from a judgment sanctioning the firm as a whole for its conduct 
in opposing the arbitration of a dispute between its client and 
Prospect Capital Corporation.127 Specifically, the law firm “chal-
lenge[d] the form and amount of the District Court’s sanctions 
on [among other things] the grounds that it improperly . .  .  
sanctioned the law firm as a whole, rather than sanctioning . . . 
[the] individual attorneys who participated directly in the litiga-
tion.”128 
The Second Circuit disagreed with the firm’s argument and 
affirmed the sanctions, holding instead that § 1927 grants courts 
the authority to award sanctions against the “‘firm as a whole’ 
. . . for the ‘actions of various lawyers.’”129 The court compared 
the § 1927 power to the inherent power that a court holds to 
sanction litigants, noting that it saw “no reason that a different 
 
 124. Id. at 444–45 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012)). 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. (holding that “[i]n these circumstances, there was clearly ‘a causal 
connection between the objectionable conduct of counsel and multiplication of 
the proceedings’” (quoting Peterson v. BMI Refractories, 124 F.3d 1386, 1396 
(11th Cir. 1997)). 
 127. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 140 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 128. Id. at 147. 
 129. Id. 
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rule should apply to § 1927 sanctions[.]”130 Furthermore, the 
court stated, holding otherwise would “upset a relatively long-
standing practice among district courts in [the Second Circuit]” 
of applying § 1927 to law firms.131 In fact, under the circum-
stances, the Court found it particularly justifiable to impose 
sanctions on the entire firm for the actions of one attorney. Itkin, 
the lawyer at issue, was a “founding, named partner of a firm 
that, according to counsel at oral argument, had ten or fifteen 
lawyers during the relevant time period.”132 As a result, “Itkin’s 
actions were indistinguishable from those of Arnold & Itkin as a 
firm . . . [and] the firm consistently accepted responsibility for 
conducting the underlying litigation.”133 Ultimately, the Second 
Circuit found that “nothing in the language of 28 U.S.C. § 1927, 
. . . [or] case law regarding that statute . . . leads us to think that 
the district court was without authority to impose sanctions on 
Arnold & Itkin as a whole.”134 As such, for the Second Circuit, 
the issue is relatively settled. 
6. The First Circuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Has Held 
That § 1927 Encompasses Law Firms 
The most recent court to weigh in on the issue, the First Cir-
cuit’s Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (B.A.P.), undoubtedly has the 
most in-depth analysis of any of the circuits noted above, on ei-
ther side of the split.135 In MJS Las Croabas Properties, Inc. v. 
FDIC, as a result of the misconduct of the Castellanos firm, the 
 
 130. Id. 
 131. Id. (citations omitted). The court also noted that “[e]ven when [district 
courts in the Second Circuit] have refrained from imposing sanctions . . . [they 
still] have assumed that § 1927 sanctions are available against law firms.” Id. 
at 148 n.5 (citations omitted). 
 132. Id. at 148. 
 133. Id. The Enmon court does not appear to consider these facts dispositive; 
rather, the firm’s choice to own the attorney’s actions throughout the litigation 
appears to be only a strong factor in imposing § 1927 sanctions on the firm. See 
id. 
 134. Id. 
 135. Interestingly, there is also a circuit split over whether bankruptcy 
courts are “Courts of the United States” for the purposes of § 1927. See generally 
Daniel Gill, 6th Cir.: Bankruptcy Courts Can Sanction as “U.S. Court,” BLOOM-
BERG B.N.A. (June 22, 2016), https://www.bna.com/6th-cir-bankruptcy 
-n57982074578. The Sixth Circuit has held bankruptcy courts fall within the 
language of the statute. See In re Royal Manor Mgmt, Inc., 652 F. App’x. 330 
(6th Cir. 2016), cert denied, 137 S. Ct. 831 (2017). 
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B.A.P. was squarely presented with the question of whether 
§ 1927 applies to law firms.136 
In conducting its analysis, the B.A.P. acknowledged the 
presence of the circuit split over the question, and noted that 
“[t]he statute does not expressly provide for vicarious liability 
[against a firm].”137 After walking through the cases involved in 
the circuit split, the B.A.P. narrowed in on Brignoli v. Balch 
Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., a district court decision out of the 
Southern District of New York.138 Specifically, the B.A.P. noted 
that the district court in Brignoli had set forth a unique analysis 
that, coupled with similar cases from the prosanction circuits 
above, persuaded the B.A.P. to find that § 1927 applied to law 
firms.139 The B.A.P. cited with approval the Brignoli court’s rea-
soning which noted that although the term “personally” in 
§ 1927 “takes on a rather distinctive meaning of ensuring that it 
is the attorney personally . . . who is taxed the costs of satisfying 
the award the court has imposed to cover the additional costs . . . 
[of] vexatious lawyering[,]” the statutory language roping in any 
“‘‘other person admitted to conduct cases’ discloses an intended 
focus of the legislation on the regulating of those entities who 
‘conduct cases,’ a statutory class or category into which law firms 
naturally fall.”140 In essence, because law firms are entities that 
“conduct cases,” in line with the language of § 1927, the Brignoli 
court held that “[t]he language of § 1927 . . . does not . . . disfavor 
requiring a law firm that is ‘conducting cases’ in a court in a 
manner that multiplies the proceedings unreasonably and vexa-
tiously to ‘satisfy personally’ the fees and costs reasonably in-
curred[.]”141 Such reasoning, the B.A.P. held, was sufficient to 
hold § 1927 applicable to law firms, and to uphold the lower 
court’s imposition of sanctions against the Castellanos law 
firm.142 
 
 136. MJS Las Croabas Props., Inc. v. FDIC, 545 B.R. 401, 419 (B.A.P. 1st 
Cir. 2016). 
 137. Id. at 419–20 (citing IRA LEESFIELD & MARK SYLVESTER, 2 LITIGATING 
TORT CASES § 20:19 (2014)). 
 138. Id. at 420 (citing Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. 
Supp. 100, 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)). 
 139. Id. at 421 (noting that the B.A.P. “[found] the reasoning of Brignoli . . . 
and cases similarly decided, persuasive. We, therefore, conclude that the bank-
ruptcy court did not err when it ruled that § 1927 permits sanctions against law 
firms.”). 
 140. Id. at 420 (citing Brignoli, 735 F. Supp. at 101–02). 
 141. Id. 
 142. Id. at 423 (upholding the lower court’s imposition of sanctions). 
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Ultimately, the circuits upholding the application of § 1927 
to law firms, all appear to follow (at least with respect to § 1927) 
a public service statutory interpretation model that enforces the 
statutes underlying purpose of punishing and deterring vexa-
tious conduct. Their interpretations, while perhaps out of step 
with the plain text of the statute, align with the view that “leg-
islat[ors] passed each statute to serve the greater good and the 
appropriate role for the court is to help the legislature accom-
plish that goal.”143 By enforcing § 1927 against law firms, and 
leaning on their sister circuits’ implicit or explicit endorsement 
of sanctioning law firms under the statute, these courts arguably 
assist Congress in implementing the goal of § 1927 by preventing 
conduct that unreasonably increased the costs of litigation.144 In-
deed, given the modern practice of law in law firms and consid-
erations of ethical limits on attorney advocacy, these circuits 
have reached the correct conclusion. 
III.  SANCTIONING LAW FIRMS UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 1927 
SHOULD BE PERMITTED AS A MATTER OF STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION, SOUND POLICY, AND THE 
PROMOTION OF STRONG PROFESSIONAL ETHICS   
Attorney sanctions may not be among the headline-grabbing 
topics the Supreme Court usually chooses to hear,145 but the na-
tional scale of the current circuit split over § 1927 has far-reach-
ing consequences that warrant the Court’s consideration.146 
Careful review of the positions of the various circuit decisions 
discussed above supports favoring the circuits that have imposed 
sanctions against law firms under § 1927 in light of principles of 
statutory interpretation, sound policy contextualized in the mod-
ern practice of law, and the importance of ethical guidelines in a 
 
 143. See BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 36. The public view also holds 
that “legislators are primarily motivated by the desire to serve the public.” Id. 
 144. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842); 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 
(1813). 
 145. See, e.g., Glossip v. Gross, 135 S. Ct. 2726 (2015) (holding that the use 
of a questionable lethal drug for executions was not cruel and unusual punish-
ment under the Eighth Amendment); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 
(2015) (holding that the Constitution guarantees a right to same-sex marriage). 
 146. The website for the U.S. Courts notes that “[t]he [Supreme] Court usu-
ally is not under any obligation to hear [any particular] case[ ] . . . it usually 
only does so if the case could have national significance, [or] might harmonize 
conflicting decisions in the federal Circuit courts.” Supreme Court Proce-
dures, U.S. COURTS, http://uscourts.gov/about-federal-courts/educational 
-resources/about-educational-outreach/activity-resources/supreme-1 (last vis-
ited Apr. 1, 2018) (emphasis added). 
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profession that may, at times, walk a thin line between zealous 
advocacy and improper conduct. Section A argues that innova-
tive principles of statutory interpretation support interpreting 
the word “persons” in § 1927 as encompassing law firms. Section 
B explains that sound policy underlying changes in the modern 
practice of law supports reading the scope of § 1927’s sanction 
power to include law firms. Finally, Section C argues that sanc-
tioning law firms under § 1927 gives courts an effective, efficient 
tool for policing the line between zealous and vexatious attorney 
advocacy on an institutional basis. Ultimately, Part III argues 
that it is appropriate and necessary to apply § 1927’s sanction 
power to law firms. 
A. PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY INTERPRETATION SUPPORT 
INTERPRETING THE WORD PERSONS IN § 1927 AS ENCOMPASSING 
LAW FIRMS UNDER A PUBLIC VIEW MODEL 
Careful consideration of the so-called public view of statu-
tory interpretation, which demands interpretation of statutes in 
accordance with the broader greater good behind each statute, 
as well as evolving concepts of the word “persons” in the legal 
profession, suggests interpreting § 1927 to apply to law firms. 
1. The Public View of Statutory Interpretation Aligns with the 
Underlying Purpose of § 1927 
Interpreting § 1927 in conformance with the greater good 
underlying its text is not necessarily the first approach a court 
might take to reading the statute. After all, the text of § 1927 
currently reads, “Any attorney or other person admitted to con-
duct cases in any court of the United States . . . who so multiples 
the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously may 
be required by the court to satisfy personally the excess costs” 
arising from such conduct.147 Under a deliberative view of stat-
utory interpretation, which assumes that the legislature acts to 
deliberately exclude that which is not mentioned in a statute,148 
the express language of § 1927 applying costs personally to the 
offending attorney—without mentioning law firms—implies 
that sanctions under its authority cannot be ascribed to law 
firms. However, under the public-view approach to statutory in-
terpretation, which assumes legislators “passed each statute to 
serve the greater good” and that “the appropriate role for the 
 
 147. 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (2012). 
 148. BROWN & BROWN, supra note 88, at 35 (describing the deliberative view 
of statutory interpretation). 
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court is to help the legislature accomplish that goal[,]”149 express 
terms in a statute can be interpreted to allow a reviewing court 
to assist the legislature to accomplish whatever goals the statute 
sought to achieve. The public view pushes back on a strict textu-
alism approach and attempts to consider the context surround-
ing the statute’s ideal implementation. 
The statute’s original purpose sought to ensure the efficient 
administration of justice in the judicial system by punishing at-
torneys who engage in conduct that unreasonably increases both 
the volume and costs of litigation.150 In fact, the language of 
§ 1927 is quite broad; it does not restrict the term vexatious be-
yond its effect on multiplying the proceedings, nor does it set 
forth any clear limitation on the degree of unreasonableness nec-
essary to trigger § 1927’s sanctions. The underlying purpose of 
decreasing litigation delays and costs, coupled with broad tex-
tual elements designed to achieve that purpose, suggests that 
the statute constitutes a rule designed to serve the greater good. 
Indeed, as the costs of seeking and receiving justice fall, the ease 
of access to the vindication of rights by the public increases. As 
such, utilizing § 1927 to impose penalties on firms that vexa-
tiously inhibit access to, and consequently raise the cost of, the 
vindication of legal rights enhances the greater good. Indeed, the 
purpose and language of § 1927 aligns well with the goals of the 
public view of statutory interpretation and favors consideration 
under such a theory. 
2. In the Context of the Modern Practice of Law, the Word 
“Person” in § 1927 Should Be Interpreted to Encompass Law 
Firms 
While not strictly persons in the eyes of the law, modern le-
gal developments support considering law firms to be persons for 
the purposes of § 1927. The statute explicitly applies to “attor-
ney[s] or other person[s] admitted to conduct cases in any court 
of the United States[.]”151 While law firms are not technically 
persons, § 1927’s use of the word persons should be read to en-
compass law firms because (1) modern developments in the law 
have shifted towards the view that certain kinds of entities, in-
cluding law firms, should be considered persons in the eyes of 
the law; and (2) in many situations, the actions of a law firm in 
 
 149. Id. at 36 (describing the public view of statutory interpretation). 
 150. See H.R. DOC. NO. 27-25, at 20–22 (1842); 26 ANNALS OF CONG. 29 
(1813). 
 151. 28 U.S.C. § 1927. 
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a case are indistinguishable from those of an individual, and in-
deed may involve many individual people. 
The theory that a law firm can constitute a legal person is 
not a recent development in legal scholarship: the partnership 
that makes up a law firm was considered to be a person, separate 
from its individual members, as far back as the Roman Em-
pire.152 In fact, the concept of a firm as an institution “greater 
than the sum of its parts . . . [with its own] legal existence, rec-
ognizable identity, and loyalty claims independent of the indi-
viduals who may own it or control it” is a fairly popular idea.153 
As discussed above, the Brignoli court built on this foundation 
by holding that law firms to fall naturally into the category of 
“other person[s] admitted to conduct cases” under § 1927 due to 
their unique nature as entities who try cases in courts of the 
United States.154 Far from being novel, the personhood of a law 
firm is historically established.155 
Even setting aside the distinct entity that is a law firm, the 
actions of an individual attorney working for a law firm may be 
indistinguishable from the actions of the law firm itself. The Sec-
ond Circuit noted in Enmon that part of its justification in im-
posing sanctions upon the law firm at issue was that the attor-
ney who had engaged in the improper conduct was a “founding, 
named partner of a firm that, according to counsel at oral argu-
ment, had ten or fifteen lawyers during the relevant time pe-
riod.”156 The actions of this named partner “were indistinguish-
able from those of [the firm itself] . . . [and] the firm consistently 
accepted responsibility for conducting the underlying litiga-
tion.”157 
 
 152. See William Hamilton Cowles, The Firm as a Legal Person, 57 CENT. 
L.J. 343, 343 (1903) (applying the principle of firm personality as a test for the 
distribution of firm assets upon liquidation); see also Teague v. Lindsey, 17 So. 
538, 542 (Ala. 1895) (“A partnership in contemplation of law, is an entity dis-
tinct from the members who compose it”); Curtis v. Hollingshead, 14 N.J.L. 402, 
410 (N.J. 1834) (“A partnership is considered in law as an artificial person, or 
being, distinct from the individuals composing it.”). 
 153. June Carbone & Nancy Levit, The Death of the Firm, 101 MINN. L. 
REV. 963, 963–64 (2016) (noting that “[p]opular accounts sometimes read [the 
Supreme Court’s] Hobby Lobby and similar decisions as conferring rights on the 
[corporate] entity. ”). 
 154. Brignoli v. Balch Hardy & Scheinman, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 100, 102 
(S.D.N.Y. 1990). 
 155. The personhood of other business entities, such as corporations, has re-
cently been acknowledged, albeit in the context of First Amendment rights. See 
generally, Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010). 
 156. Enmon v. Prospect Capital Corp., 675 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 157. Id. 
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In fact, “[t]he modern, large law firm is not a world of indi-
viduals, but rather a team-based workplace.”158 As a result, 
courts have, “as an evidentiary matter,” difficulty assigning 
blame to particular lawyers, “each of whom has an incentive to 
shift responsibility . . . onto others in the firm.”159 Indeed, in a 
team context, “the probability that [a] particular offending indi-
vidual faces liability for any wrongful act is relatively low.”160 In 
larger law firms, even the individual signing the various vexa-
tious court documents may not have been the person who actu-
ally made the decision that lead to delay and increased costs. As 
such, “the difficulty of identifying a single lawyer as the actual 
transgressor in the law firm’s team-based setting means that in-
dividual-aimed sanctions . . . are basically moot as deter-
rents.”161 Utilizing a sanction against the firm, however, deploys 
§ 1927 in a manner that may actually have an effect. As one au-
thor eloquently stated: 
Given the evidentiary problems of pinning . . . misconduct on one or 
more members of a lawyering team, the reluctance to scapegoat some 
lawyers for sins potentially shared by others in their firm, and espe-
cially the importance of a law firm’s ethical infrastructure . . . a disci-
plinary regime that targets only individual lawyers in an era of large 
law firms is no longer sufficient. Sanctions against firms are needed as 
well.162 
The application of § 1927 to larger law firms also retains the 
statute’s ability to strike individuals where the vexatious con-
duct is truly attributable to one individual, especially in smaller 
law firms. Truly individual vexatious actions should necessarily 
be sanctioned as such; this Note does not argue otherwise. Ra-
ther, courts considering sanctions against a law firm under this 
proposed reading of § 1927 should carefully review the context 
and nature of the litigation, as well as the vexatious conduct, in 
order to determine whether a firm-wide sanction best fits the cir-
cumstances.163 
 
 158. Note, Collective Sanctions and Large Law Firm Discipline (hereinafter 
“Collective Sanctions”), 118 HARV. L. REV. 2336, 2339 (2005). 
 159. Id. While this source is contextualized in breaches of ethical rules, the 
principle arguably remains the same. 
 160. Id. 
 161. Id. at 2345. 
 162. Ted Schneyer, Professional Discipline for Law Firms?, 77 CORNELL L. 
REV. 1, 8 (1991). 
 163. The exact scope of review that a court should utilize is outside the con-
fines of this Note. As a possible alternative, which should perhaps be considered 
by courts considering firm-wide sanctions, at least one author has proposed a 
disciplinary scheme where each individual lawyer in the team responsible for 
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Ultimately, even where individuals engage in egregious con-
duct, the nature of the partnership164 in which they are engaged 
indicates that a law firm has the capability of being considered 
a person in the eyes of § 1927, or at the very least some sort of 
entity equivalent to a person for the purposes of the statute. Im-
posing § 1927 sanctions against a law firm simply acknowledges 
the reality of the modern practice of law, at least in the context 
of a large law firm. While firm-wide sanctions under § 1927 may 
be a closer question with respect to smaller law firms, ascertain-
ing the context surrounding the vexatious conduct permits a 
court to carefully target either the responsible individual, or the 
firm as a whole. 
B. SOUND POLICY SURROUNDING THE MODERN PRACTICE OF 
LAW IN LAW FIRMS SUGGESTS THAT SANCTIONS AGAINST LAW 
FIRMS WILL BETTER ACHIEVE THE PURPOSES OF THE STATUTE 
Section 1927 should be applied to law firms to ensure that 
internal tribalism and absorbed behaviors do not infect a law 
firm’s culture. The modern practice of law has evolved im-
mensely in recent years, and the development of massive 2000-
or-more-person law firms has fundamentally altered the way in 
which law is practiced both domestically and on the interna-
tional stage.165 No longer is an apprenticeship the primary form 
of learning to practice law. The development of large law firms 
has given rise to a form of internal tribalism that attorneys 
 
the vexatious conduct faces sanctions unless the group produces a culpable in-
dividual. See Collective Sanctions, supra note 158, at 2336. Doing so would en-
sure that “[t]he responsible group facing punishment [would] be the smallest 
identifiable group from which the offense . . . originated.” Id. at 2336–37. While 
perhaps viable, such a disciplinary scheme may run into difficulties where indi-
vidual responsibility is truly lacking, such as when the vexatious action taken 
is ingrained in the law firm’s normal litigation strategy. 
 164. Drawing distinctions between different types of law firm business ar-
rangements (for example, LLCs versus LLPs) under the scope of § 1927’s power 
may be necessary for court’s considering sanctions, though this Note does not 
explore that possibility. Each business arrangement offers differing benefits to 
those involved. See generally Eric Feigenbaum, Limited Liability Partnership 
Vs. Limited Liability Company, CHRON, http://smallbusiness.chron.com/limited 
-liability-partnership-vs-limited-liability-company-3736.html (last visited Apr. 
1, 2018). 
 165. Stephen M. Sheppard, The American Legal Profession in the Twenty-
First Century, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. SUPP. 241, 260–61 (2014) (noting that in 2013, 
“the largest five [law firms in the United States] were over two thousand attor-
neys .”). The United States certainly leads the world in developing the law firm 
to its logical extreme, at least in terms of size. Id. (citing David Scott Clark, 
Legal Professions and Law Firms, in COMPARATIVE LAW AND SOCIETY 362, 384–
85 (David Scott Clark ed., 2012)). 
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within law firms tend to associate with; specifically, the “law 
firms and attorneys who . . . generally represent[ ] one form of 
client . . . tend to adopt a worldview contrary to the worldview of 
the lawyers representing clients with adverse interests.”166 This 
tribalism creates a unique environment in which the attitudes 
and norms of senior attorneys, or even a legal-service institution 
as a whole, are often absorbed by lawyers employed alongside 
those senior attorneys, or within the legal-service institution it-
self.167 Indeed, even the American Bar Association has noted 
that “the ethical atmosphere of a firm can influence the conduct 
of all its members.”168 
In addition to the uniform ethical atmosphere inside large 
law firms, the division of labor inherent within massive law 
firms favors attributing individual attorney conduct to the firm 
in its entirety. The development of large law firms, coupled with 
increases in technology and connectivity, has caused the legal 
profession to become increasingly specialized.169 Coupled with 
increased demand for legal services, law firms seeking further 
expansion have chosen to market their legal expertise by high-
lighting their specializations.170 This specialization has led to 
the decline of individual attorney autonomy and the increased 
emulation of a corporate structure.171 The corporate structure 
 
 166. Id. at 261. An excellent example of this tribalism can be found in the 
different club-like attitudes that characterize the Defense Bar  and the “Plain-
tiff ’s Bar.” Id. At least one author has argued that the isolated nature of indi-
vidual practice groups in large firms helps alleviate this practice. See, e.g., Kifer, 
supra note 21, at 569 n. 172. However, this argument ignores a potential firm-
wide culture of improper aggressiveness that stems from ethical structures, and 
not just practice group structures. A pervasive attitude towards ethics can cer-
tainly infect multiple practice groups. 
 167. LERMAN & SCHRAG, supra note 19, at 12–13 (noting that the absorption 
process can occur “even if what is going on around [the attorneys] is inconsistent 
with published or official professional norms”). 
 168. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT r. 5.1 cmt. (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983). 
 169. See Moorhead, supra note 15 (noting that specialization within the legal 
profession is both “well established” and “growing in impact”). 
 170. Id. at 228 (noting that “elite firms solidify their position [on the market] 
. . . by expanding and underlining their reputation for excellence through that 
process of specialization”). 
 171. Id. at 229 (“In commercial firms, specialization is said to have advanced 
alongside a decline in lawyer autonomy while commercial lawyers become 
wealthier . . . and increasingly emulate the business structures of their cli-
ents.”). 
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serves to decrease an individual attorney’s autonomy over a par-
ticular client matter.172 That individual autonomy is exactly 
what § 1927 targets when it is used to sanction individual attor-
neys for their own individual conduct. However, the statute’s ef-
fectiveness and vitality are substantially diminished when sanc-
tions are imposed against an attorney whose individual conduct 
is but one part of a large division of labor within a modern law 
firm. Put another way, large modern law firms and their division 
of labor renders sanctions against individual attorneys about as 
effective as removing one of the mythical hydra’s heads; it might 
slow down the creature, but in the end two more heads will grow 
to replace the one lost without any real change to the nature of 
the creature itself.173 
It is also no longer the case that attorneys remain geograph-
ically isolated; they can spread pettifoggery nationally—or even 
internationally—by simply catching a flight to wherever a hear-
ing is located.174 As one district court judge noted, “More and 
more, I look across the bench to see lawyers not just from my 
home state of Illinois but also those who are appearing before me 
pro hac vice from New York, Boston, Washington, D.C., Miami, 
Dallas, Houston, Los Angeles, or San Francisco.”175 This in-
creased mobility undermines one of the most powerful deterrent 
effects of sanctions: the reputation of a lawyer in their commu-
nity.176 By practicing nationally, the effect of a sanction upon an 
attorney’s reputation is dampened through sheer distance. A 
sanction against that attorney’s law firm, on the other hand, has 
an impact on the reputation of the firm itself. Consequently, us-
ing § 1927 against a law firm to reinforce the reputational deter-
rence of sanction power helps compensate for the national reach 
enjoyed in the modern practice of law. 
 
 172. Id. (noting specializations parallel development alongside decline in at-
torney autonomy); see also Garicano & Hubbard, supra note 18 (noting that spe-
cialized firms tend to increase the division of labor across individuals). 
 173. For a general explanation of the properties of a Hydra creature, see Hy-
dra, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.britannica.com/ 
topic/Hydra-Greek-mythology. 
 174. Holderman, supra note 24, at 47 (noting “the proliferation of national 
and international law firms and the ever-increasing mobility of the trial lawyers 
who litigate in courts throughout the country.”). 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 44 (“Although sanctions can impact attorneys’ pocketbooks . . . 
perhaps even more powerful is the negative effect that sanctions can have on 
an attorney’s standing in the legal community. Sanctions are . . . an official 
statement from a court that an attorney . . . [requires] reprimand[ing].”). 
 2018] PUNISHING THE PETTIFOGGER’S PRACTICE 1765 
 
One potentially adverse effect of permitting firm-wide sanc-
tions under § 1927 stems from the typical structure of compen-
sation in a law firm; partners earn the most as a result of their 
direct access to firm profits. A firm-wide sanction would dispro-
portionately fall upon partners while almost entirely avoiding 
associates, because any firm-wide sanction would be paid out of 
the firm’s own pocket, thereby “reduc[ing] a partner’s individual 
draw as it eats into firm profits.”177 Partners may also face per-
sonal liability for any shortfall.178 Associates, on the other hand, 
remain relatively untouched: associate salaries are typically un-
harmed by the monetary effects of large financial obligations 
such as sanctions, and any reputational harm to the firm is ren-
dered less potent by most associates’ ability to quickly disassoci-
ate themselves from vexatious acts by relocating to a different 
employer.179 
However, rather than consider such an impact to be im-
proper, any disproportionate effect that firm-wide sanctions in-
flict upon partners should be considered a positive feature of 
§ 1927’s sanction power. Indeed, it is the partners, not the asso-
ciates, that typically cause internal tribalism of the kind that 
triggers vexatious sanction-worthy conduct; the attitudes and 
norms of senior attorneys are often absorbed by lawyers em-
ployed alongside those senior attorneys.180 As such, allowing the 
impact of a firm-wide sanction to fall upon partners may actually 
achieve the desired deterrent effect precisely because the part-
ners are in the best position to potentially modify the attitudes 
and norms of an entire firm. 
Ultimately, sanctioning the law firm itself renders the pur-
pose of § 1927 far more effective in the modern legal profession 
because it allows a court to directly attack the source of the vex-
atious behavior and send an institution-wide signal that miscon-
duct will not be tolerated.181 Furthermore, applying the statute 
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 179. Id. at 2345. 
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against law firms keeps intact its individual sanction scope; 
where an attorney retains substantial individual autonomy over 
a case (such as in a smaller law firm, or solo practice), the statute 
still permits the imposition of sanctions on an individual attor-
ney. While this distinction may require a court to analyze the 
responsibility held by an individual attorney in order to evaluate 
the level of autonomy present over a given matter, courts should 
not shy from such an inquiry. In fact, in order to ensure that such 
vexatious conduct is deterred effectively, courts should embrace 
such a task. Applying § 1927 against law firms serves to mod-
ernize the statute’s use in line with contemporary law firm prac-
tices, while retaining its original scope. 
C. SANCTIONING LAW FIRMS REINFORCES A STRONG ETHICAL 
GUIDELINE TO ATTORNEYS THAT ZEALOUS ADVOCACY DOES NOT 
NECESSITATE UNFOUNDED LEGAL STRATEGIES 
The imposition of sanctions against law firms under § 1927 
is particularly important in light of the strong possibility (per-
haps even inevitability) that lawyers working in large law firms 
will absorb and adopt the ethical norms and behaviors of their 
peers and superiors.182 Ensuring the integrity of the legal pro-
fession is particularly crucial given the unique role attorneys 
have in ensuring “the recognition and protection of rights and 
powers in the citizen and in the state”; indeed, “the broad work 
of the profession will very likely remain central to American 
life.”183 By enforcing sanctions against law firms under § 1927, 
the courts could control a unique tool to curb potential overzeal-
ous litigation strategies, particularly in civil discovery.184 
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Such a need is particularly apparent when the realities of 
modern firm practice are considered. Many, if not most, of the 
tasks performed in large law firms are assigned to teams of law-
yers in order to effectuate a relatively efficient work environ-
ment.185 Client appreciation of efficiency aside, teaming up en-
courages attorneys to take ethical risks that they would not take 
individually while obscuring responsibility for the team’s actions 
behind a group of individuals united in the common practice of 
law.186 Put simply, while a single lawyer may have “sign[ed] the 
complaint or motion, such filings are often the joint product of 
‘background preparation and drafting by several attorneys[.]’”187 
Punishing a single lawyer for vexatious conduct that ultimately 
stemmed from a team of attorneys does nothing but select a 
scapegoat that, upon the rendering of due punishment, leaves 
the status quo within the firm untouched. A punishment levied 
against the firm as a whole, however, encompasses teams of at-
torneys who act as one while litigating—a method of sanction 
arguably best utilized under § 1927. 
Of course, it could be argued that § 1927 is unnecessary in 
light of Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and the 
inherent power possessed by the judiciary to sanction litigants. 
Rule 11’s text explicitly includes law firms within its sanction 
power, and a court’s inherent authority arguably serves as a 
catch-all to ensure that particularly unethical conduct is not per-
mitted to slip through the cracks.188 However, there are substan-
tial limitations on the scope of Rule 11’s sanction power that sug-
gest § 1927 should serve as a valid—and perhaps even 
desirable—alternative. Rule 11 sanction power is limited to doc-
uments signed and filed with the court that bring frivolous 
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claims, whereas § 1927 encompasses all actions that “unreason-
ably and vexatiously” multiply the proceedings.189 Furthermore, 
with respect to any power inherent in a court to sanction and 
control individuals appearing before it, courts typically prefer to 
use sanction power drawn from current rules.190 Doing so per-
mits the imposition of a clear set of standards to guide both fu-
ture cases and other lawyers, as opposed to case-specific argu-
ments on why inherent authority necessitates sanctions.191 As 
an ethical guideline to attorneys and firms moving forward, uti-
lizing § 1927 to create a clear set of standards from a national 
body of case law provides less uncertainty and more predictabil-
ity for everyone involved.192 Indeed, it may trigger a decline in 
incidents of pettifoggery. 
Using § 1927 as a tool to set clear ethical norms for the legal 
profession also aligns well with the principles advanced in the 
ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility.193 Rule 3.1, for 
example, states that “[a] lawyer shall not bring or defend a pro-
ceeding, or assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is 
a basis in law and fact for doing so that is not frivolous.”194 The 
Rule attempts to draw a fine line between “the “duty to use legal 
procedure for the fullest benefit of the client[]” and “[the] duty 
not to abuse legal procedure.”195 Section 1927 helps courts clarify 
the line between client advocacy and abuse of legal procedure by 
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providing a uniform statutory basis that lawyers and judges can 
rely on in the future. Additionally, § 1927 also applies where 
claims are not entirely frivolous but are certainly unreasonable 
and vexatious. In short, applying § 1927 to law firms adds clarity 
and uniformity to existing ethical rules and gives the judiciary a 
useful tool in policing the line between zealous advocacy and un-
ethical pettifoggery. 
  CONCLUSION   
Walking the fine line between overzealous and appropriate 
advocacy is not always easy; such a balancing act is perhaps even 
more arduous when a law firm to which an attorney belongs pro-
motes the kind of tactics § 1927 specifically seeks to prevent. Pet-
tifoggers in the legal profession, especially those supported by 
their law firms, impose a heavy burden on the efficient admin-
istration of justice. Attorneys who frustrate the smooth admin-
istration of justice harm the effectiveness of the judiciary, and 
ultimately damage both the clients they oppose, and those they 
represent. Indeed, vexatiously prolonging litigation serves only 
to undermine the role that attorneys in the United States play 
in the vindication of legal rights. 
The circuit split regarding the use of § 1927 to curb such 
pettifoggery dulls a potentially poignant tool that could be used 
to deter such attorney and law firm misconduct on a national 
scale. For § 1927 to be effective, an unambiguous national stand-
ard must exist to avoid protracted proceedings over the scope of 
the statute itself.196 By utilizing broad statutory interpretation 
principles, in light of the context of individual attorney auton-
omy in the modern practice of law and the importance of unified, 
clear ethical standards for the legal profession, § 1927 clearly 
stands out as a tool best suited to quell pettifoggery before it has 
a chance to permeate the legal profession to any greater extent. 
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